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Abstract 
 When an individual’s health status is observable, but evolving over time, the key to 
maintaining a successful health insurance arrangement is to have the healthier members of the 
group cross-subsidize those who experience adverse health outcomes. We argue that 
impediments to worker mobility may serve to mitigate the attrition of healthy individuals from 
employer-sponsored insurance pools, thereby creating a de facto commitment mechanism that 
allows for more complete insurance of health risks than would be possible in the absence of such 
frictions. Using data on health insurance contracts obtained from the 1987 National Medical 
Expenditure Survey, we find that the quantity of insurance provided, as measured by lifetime 
limits on benefits and annual stop-loss amounts, is positively related to the degree of worker 
commitment. These results illustrate the importance of commitment in the design of long-term 
contracts, and provide an additional rationale for the practice of bundling health insurance with 
employment.
 
 
“Shaneen and Tom Wahl were paying $417 a month for health insurance when 
Mrs. Wahl was diagnosed with breast cancer in 1996. Their premiums began 
rising steadily, and by August 2000, the Wahls were told that their new rate would 
be $1,881 a month. Mrs. Wahl, whose cancer is in remission, tried to find out 
why. Unsatisfied with answers they got on the phone, the…couple visited 
the…offices of the insurer. There…an executive explained why her premium was 
soaring: ‘because of your dread disease.’ It’s called re-underwriting.  
 
A key challenge in individual health insurance is keeping the healthier people 
enrolled. Their premiums are needed to subsidize those who get sick. The 
problem, under the traditional approach, is that the healthiest tend to drop out as 
rising medical costs gradually drive up premiums…. Advocates of re-
underwriting argue that because it gives smaller rate increases to the healthy, it 
keeps more of them enrolled and paying premiums…” 
 
Chad Terhune, Wall Street Journal, April 9, 2002 
1. Introduction 
 The recent debate over the use of annual re-underwriting in the context of individual 
health insurance policies highlights the difficulties that insurers face when attempting to craft a 
stable insurance pool. In a setting where an individual’s health status is observable, but evolving 
over time, the key to maintaining a successful insurance arrangement is to have healthier 
members of the group commit to cross subsidize members who experience adverse health 
outcomes. In the absence of a precommitment mechanism, however, those who turn out to be 
healthier than average may find it advantageous to leave the risk pool, and to purchase 
alternative coverage at a premium that more accurately reflects their own, observable, health 
status.1 This erodes the actuarial integrity of the pool and, consequently, the ability of insurers to 
offer insurance against both the financial losses associated with a particular illness episode, and 
the classification risk that results when insurance premiums are adjusted to reflect changes in 
one’s health status over time. 
 This paper examines a theoretical model of insurance contract design in which 
impediments to worker mobility may serve to mitigate the attrition of healthy individuals from 
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employer-sponsored insurance pools, thereby creating a de-facto commitment mechanism that 
allows for more complete insurance of health risks than would be possible in the absence of such 
frictions. We characterize optimal health insurance contracts in an environment where a worker’s 
evolving health status is publicly observable, and in which employees vary in the transactions 
costs that they must incur when switching to an alternative employer. Using data on 
employment-based health insurance plans, we find that the structure of insurance contracts 
observed in practice is consistent with the predictions of the model, providing empirical 
documentation for the importance of precommitment in the design of health insurance contracts. 
 Traditional analyses of contracting in insurance markets have tended to emphasize the 
role of informational asymmetries, which engender problems of adverse selection (Rothschild 
and Stiglitz 1976; Crocker and Snow 1986) or moral hazard (Shavell 1979). A recent article by 
Cardon and Hendel (2001), however, finds no evidence of adverse selection in health insurance 
markets and suggests instead that the lack of commitment in long-term contracts examined by 
Cochrane (1995) may be a more relevant source of market failure in health insurance settings. 
Accordingly, we consider a full information model in which insureds are initially identical but 
anticipate receiving a public signal that will provide information about their expected future 
health care costs. As a consequence, the risk-averse purchasers of health insurance face two 
potential sources of uncertainty: the financial loss associated with adverse health outcomes, and 
the classification risk that results when their future insurance premiums reflect the publicly 
available information on each individual’s likely health-related expenses.  
 In such a setting, an optimal insurance contract would entail full compensation for all the 
losses suffered from illness as well as a constant, ex ante actuarially fair, premium charged to all 
individuals independently of the state or their observed health status. While such a package 
provides full insurance against both types of uncertainty, the cross-subsidy from low- to high-
risk individuals in the future, which is inherent in the non-experience-rated premiums required to 
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cover the classification risk, gives those with lower expected health care costs the incentive to 
exit the insurance pool, and to purchase independent coverage at a price that more accurately 
reflects their own, observable, expected health care costs. As others have noted (Cochrane 1995; 
Pauly, Kunreuther, and Hirth 1995), it is this inability of insureds to precommit to remain in the 
pool in light of favorable information on health status that provides an impediment to the 
insurability of classification risk.2  
Paradoxically, the ability to insure against such risks is enhanced if there exist obstacles 
to the mobility of insureds that mitigate the erosion of the insurance pool caused by the departure 
of lower-risk individuals. In an environment where employer-sponsored health insurance is the 
norm, one of the largest impediments to insured mobility is the cost of switching jobs. To the 
extent that health insurance is bundled with employment, any frictions associated with employee 
mobility across occupations or employers necessarily translate into a de-facto commitment to 
one’s employer, which results in a more stable and, hence insurable, risk pool. Thus, the 
existence of frictions that impede worker mobility between alternative employments may have 
heretofore unappreciated beneficent effects through its impact on the insurability of health risks.  
 The validity of this approach, of course, depends crucially on the requirement that 
insureds switch jobs in order to obtain alternative insurance coverage. This would appear to be a 
reasonable proposition in practice since the vast majority of insured individuals receive their 
health coverage through employer-sponsored plans. The difficulties associated with the offering 
of private health insurance are well known, and include the traditional problem of adverse 
selection with non-group insurance (Pauly 1986), as well as the high fixed costs generally 
encountered in the administration of individual policies (Diamond 1992). As a result, the terms 
associated with independently purchased health insurance, to the extent that it is available, are 
less than attractive when compared to the employer-sponsored alternative (Gruber and Madrian 
1994). 
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 The role of precommitment in the design of efficient multi-period contracts has received 
increasing attention in the literature.3 The most germane for this study is a recent paper by 
Hendel and Lizzeri (forthcoming) who, in the context of life insurance, examine the use of “front 
loaded” premiums as a mechanism through which insureds can commit credibly to remain in the 
insurance pool. Theirs is a model of symmetric information in which the purchasers of insurance 
may face classification risk based on their evolving actuarial status, and in which those who turn 
out to have a lower risk of mortality may, in the absence of precommitment, exit the life 
insurance pool. While the prepayment of premiums may be an effective tool to “lock-in” 
customers in life insurance, Cutler and Zeckhauser (2000) note that it is less likely to provide a 
solution to the commitment problem in health insurance settings due to the greater complexity of 
that market.4 Thus, health insurers must use other commitment devices—such as employer 
sponsorship of health plans—to craft stable insurance pools. 
 The paper proceeds as follows. In the next section we examine a model of employer-
sponsored health insurance in which the publicly observed health status of employees changes 
over time. Under the assumption that the insured workers incur a financial cost when switching 
jobs to obtain alternative insurance coverage, we characterize the structure of efficient employer-
sponsored insurance contracts. Our model offers several predictions concerning the relationship 
between these switching costs, which we term “job attachment,” and the amount of insurance 
coverage available through employment-based groups. We find that when employers offer the 
same contract to all of their workers, the optimal contract exhibits a coverage limitation that is 
inversely proportional to the amount of job attachment present in the firm. In addition, if 
employers are able to offer multiple contracts that induce self-selection by insureds, the contracts 
exhibit more complete coverage of medical expenditures, albeit at premiums that partially reflect 
the health status of plan participants. 
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 Section three presents empirical tests of the model’s predictions using data on health 
insurance contracts obtained from the 1987 National Medical Expenditure Survey conducted by 
the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, matched to proxies for job attachment from 
the 1977 Dictionary of Occupational Titles (U.S. Department of Labor 1981). Consistent with 
the predictions of our model, we find that the contracts associated with firms who offer a single 
health insurance policy exhibit coverage limitations that are decreasing in job attachment while 
firms offering multiple policies have higher levels of coverage which are less sensitive to job 
attachment. A final section contains concluding remarks. 
2. Theoretical Framework 
We consider an environment in which a continuum of individuals face the financial risk 
associated with becoming ill at some future date. All of the agents are assumed to be identical 
initially and have the same probability, p , of sickness. Each agent also anticipates receiving 
publicly observable information about her own health status prior to the state in which illness 
may occur. Accordingly, an individual realizes that with probability ( ) 1λ −λ  she will turn out 
to be a high (low) risk with the probability  ) (  LH pp of suffering illness, where 
0 1 >>> LH pp  and ≡p LH pp )1( λλ −+ . Individual consumers have an income Y and, in the 
event of sickness, suffer the financial loss S. For the purposes of this model, we assume that 
workers obtain a health benefits package at the time they become employed, but prior to 
receiving the information on their health status. This package may consist of either a single 
insurance contract or a menu of potential insurance choices. Prior to becoming ill, however, 
workers obtain information on their health status, which may affect their incentives to remain in 
one of the plans offered by their employer, or to select alternative options in cases where multi-
plan benefit packages are offered. This sequence of events is illustrated with a timeline in 
Figure 1. 
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 Each individual is assumed to be risk averse and to possess the von 
Neumann-Morgenstern utility function ( )jU W , where jW  is the agent’s wealth in the sick 
( )j S=  and not-sick ( )j N=  states. An insurance contract { },c Z R≡  consists of a premium, 
Z , paid by the insured individual prior to the state in which illness may occur, and a 
reimbursement, R , received by the insured in the event of illness. The expected utility of an 
agent who purchases the insurance contract c, and who has the probability of illness p , is 
written as 
 ),()1(  )(  );( NS WUpWpUpcv −+≡              (1) 
where RSZYWS +−−≡ , and ZYWN −≡ . Since public information regarding each agent’s 
type will be available prior to the period in which illness may occur, the information structure of 
the model permits individuals to be treated differently depending on their publicly-known types. 
Letting { },i i ic Z R=  denote the contract associated with an individual whose observed health 
status indicates her to be a type { } ,i H L∈ , a health insurance benefits package { }C c cH L≡ ,  
results in an expected utility to an agent (prior to obtaining health status information) of 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ;1  ;  LLHH pcvpcvCV λλ −+≡ .              (2) 
Since we assume that insurance firms are risk-neutral, we may write the profit associated with 
the offering of package C  as 
 );()1(  );( )( LLHH pcpcC πλλπ −+≡Π               (3) 
where the profit earned on an individual of type i  is iiiii RpZpc −≡);(π . 
A. Spot Markets and Efficient Benefit Packages 
 Before proceeding, we consider two benchmark cases. The first is the equilibrium that 
would occur in the spot market were insurance not bundled with employment, and workers were 
to purchase actuarially fair insurance after their health status had been observed. It is 
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straightforward to demonstrate that the equilibrium is characterized by a solution to the problem 
of selecting C to maximize the expected utility of insureds (2) subject to the zero profit constraint 
Z p Ri i i=  for each { }.,  LHi∈  While the resulting contract provides full insurance against the 
financial loss generated by an illness, so R Si =  for each i , the insured is completely exposed to 
the classification risk associated with alternative health outcomes through the experience-rated 
(future) premiums, iZ . The spot market contracts are depicted in Figure 2, where the insured 
receives ( ) ˆˆ LH cc  if she is viewed to be high (low) risk. 
 As an alternative to the spot market, insureds could opt for a contract negotiated prior to 
receiving knowledge of their health status. Such a full commitment insurance package is 
characterized by a solution to the problem which maximizes insured utility (2) subject to 
( ) ,0≥CΠ  which is depicted as *C  in Figure 2 and results in full coverage of all illness-related 
expenses ( ) SRR LH ≡= as well as a constant, ex ante actuarially fair, premium which does not 
depend on revealed health status ( ).SpZZ LH ≡=  Although the full commitment package 
completely insulates insureds from both the financial risk of illness and the classification risk 
associated with observable changes in health status, the premium structure entails a cross-
subsidy in which low-risk (high-risk) individuals pay a premium which is above (below) their 
publicly-known actuarially fair rate. Since the courts will not generally enforce long-term 
contracts against insurance purchasers, the low-risk ( Lp -type) insureds may successfully renege 
on their promise to pay the pooling premium Sp  unless other mechanisms to enforce 
compliance can be implemented. 5 
B. Partial Commitment Through Employment Bundling 
 When health insurance is provided only as part of an employment package, frictions 
associated with movement to alternative employers may serve to impede the ability of those 
individuals who find that they are low-risk from leaving the insurance pool. To investigate the 
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extent to which such mobility frictions can serve as such a precommitment device, we assume 
that the low-risk workers can obtain full, and actuarially fair, health insurance after their health 
status is revealed, but in so doing must incur a switching cost, K , of moving to an alternative 
employer. Accordingly, the extent to which an insurance package can insure against 
classification risks is limited by the following feasibility constraint 
 )(  );( O
LL WUpcv ≥                 (4) 
where 0
LW Y K p S= − − , which guarantees that a low-risk individual prefers their current 
insurance plan to the (actuarially fair, full insurance) outside option. 
 The existence of the worker attachment conferred by the switching cost K  permits some 
degree of commitment on the part of insureds to remain in the insurance pool even if they turn 
out to be healthier than average. We will examine the effect of this ability to precommit in two 
insurance settings, the first of which requires that insurers offer the same contract to all insureds 
independently of their revealed health status, while the second permits insurers to design benefit 
packages which induce the members of the pool to voluntarily select insurance contracts that 
result in experience-rated premiums.6 
B.1 Single-Contract Benefit Packages. One method of mitigating classification risk is by 
offering an insurance package that does not take into account each insured’s evolving health 
status. Let C P  denote a pooling package in which PLH ccc ≡= . The optimal pooling package 
consists of the contract { }c Z RP P P≡ ,  that maximizes (2) subject to the zero profit (3) and 
feasibility (4) constraints. The contract associated with the optimal pooling package is formally 
characterized by Theorem 1 in the Appendix, and may be described with reference to Figure 3.  
For sufficiently low levels of worker commitment K , the indifference curve associated 
with the feasibility constraint, )( O
L
WUV = , lies everywhere below the pooling zero-profit 
locus, Rp . In such a setting, there is no pooling contract acceptable to low-risk individuals, so 
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that a pooling package cannot be implemented. As K  becomes larger, resulting in higher 
degrees of employee commitment, eventually a critical value ( K1 ) is reached at which the 
indifference curve associated with the feasibility constraint intersects the pooling zero profit 
locus, resulting in a feasible pooling insurance package. Further increases in K  cause the 
contract c P  to migrate up the zero-profit pooling locus, which is the situation depicted in 
Figure 3. As K  continues to increase, eventually the critical value 2K  is reached that permits the 
contract *C  to be achieved. The implication is that firms offering a single health insurance plan 
should have coverage limitations that are decreasing in the degree of worker commitment, K . 
B.2 Multi-Contract Benefit Packages. In some cases, firms may offer multiple choices to 
workers, who choose their preferred coverage from amongst the various insurance options. 
While employer-sponsored insurance plans rarely engage in mandatory experience rating of 
individual participants in an insurance pool,7 some benefit designs provide the mechanism by 
which a form of voluntary experience rating can be effected through the offering of insurance 
contracts that induce self-selection by the insureds. Formally, an insurance package { },H Lc c  can 
discriminate based upon health status as long as 
 ( ) ( ); ;H H L Hv c p v c p≥               (5) 
which requires that high-risk individuals prefer the insurance contract c H to c L .8 An optimal 
multi-contract benefit package, which is formally characterized in Theorem 2 of the Appendix, is 
a solution to the problem that selects { }c cH L,  to maximize (2) subject to the zero profit (3), 
feasibility (4) and self-selection (5) constraints.9 
An optimal insurance package with multiple contracts is illustrated as { }c cH L,  in 
Figure 4, where the efficient pooling contract, c P , has been included for comparison purposes. 
The locus *AC  depicts the set of contracts sold to low-risk individuals which, when coupled 
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with a full-coverage ( )HR S=  contract that is equally valued by high-risk individuals (so 
( ) ( ); ;H H L Hv c p v c p= ), satisfies the aggregate zero profit constraint (3) with equality.10 In the 
absence of the feasibility constraint imposed by the potential exit of low-risk individuals, the 
optimal contract would be the full commitment package *C . When that feasibility constraint 
binds, however, the closest the insurer can get to the full-commitment contract is the multi-
contract package depicted as { }c cH L,  in the figure, which exposes the low-risk insureds to a 
financial loss in the event of illness, and the high-risk insureds to some classification risk. 
 There are several aspects of the optimal multi-contract package that are worthy of note. 
First, { }c cH L,  represents a Pareto improvement over the pooling contract c P , since high risks 
are strictly better off and low risks no worse.11 Second, the multi-contract package provides some 
insurance against classification risk, although that protection is not complete due to the need to 
keep the low risks in the insurance pool.12 Third, the optimal pooling contract always provides 
less coverage than do either of the contracts offered under the multi-contract package 
( R R S RP L H< < = ). Finally, since c P  and c L  both converge to *C  as K  increases (and 
coincide with *C  at 2K ), the effect of increased worker commitment on coverage limitations is 
more pronounced in the optimal pooling package than in either of the contracts offered in the 
efficient multi-contract package. These results will be useful when we implement our empirical 
tests because they eliminate the need to identify which type of contract ( LH cc or  ) is held by 
survey respondents in firms that offer multi-contract insurance packages. We therefore have the 
following testable implication of the theory. 
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Theorem 3: Firms which offer a single insurance contract to their workforce should have lower 
levels of coverage that are more sensitive to worker commitment than firms which 
offer multi-contract packages. Thus, p iR R<  , and 
dK
dR
dK
dR ip
>  , for { }LHi ,∈ . 
Proof: Contained in the Appendix. 
 The importance of job attachment ( )0K >  is that it permits a limited degree of cross 
subsidization from the low-risk to the high-risk customers to be implemented, without inducing 
the former to leave the insurance pool. This allows the health benefits package to provide some 
insurance against the classification risk faced by the insureds. In settings with no job attachment 
( )0K = , there is no way of effecting such a subsidy, which is exactly the situation encountered 
in the individual heath insurance market and the reason that insured individuals end up exposed 
to classification risk. We now turn to an examination of the data. 
3. Empirical Analysis 
In the previous section we demonstrated that with limited commitment efficient health 
insurance contracts cannot fully insure both the financial risk associated with adverse health 
outcomes and the classification risk arising from the ex post categorization of agents into risk 
classes. Where only a single insurance policy is offered by firms, workers are fully protected 
against classification risk, but remain uninsured against large losses due to the imposition of 
coverage limitations. Conversely, in firms offering multiple (separating) contracts, workers 
benefit from more generous loss insurance, but at the cost of receiving only partial insurance 
against the prospect of health-related increases in premiums. In practice, both distortions 
represent a major source of uninsured risk for consumers. As discussed in Cochrane (1995), the 
imposition of lifetime benefit caps and the lack of protection against health-related increases in 
premiums prevent agents from fully insuring themselves against the often catastrophic medical 
expenditures associated with chronic illnesses such as diabetes, cancer, or organ failure. 
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 From an empirical perspective, the main testable implication of the model is the finding 
that the amount of insurance contained in employment-based health insurance contracts should 
be positively related to agents’ ability to precommit to remain in a particular insurance pool. 
Because workers often must change jobs to obtain more favorable health insurance coverage, 
measures of the transactions costs associated with moving among employers can be used to 
proxy for insured commitment, thereby permitting a direct test of the effect of precommitment 
on the design of contractual agreements. 
A. Data 
Our empirical analysis is conducted using detailed employment and health insurance data 
from two components of the 1987 National Medical Expenditure Survey (NMES): The 
Household Survey and the Health Insurance Plans Survey (HIPS), matched to proxies for job 
attachment from the 1977 Dictionary of Occupational Titles. The DOT provides information on 
the physical demands, environmental conditions, and educational and vocational preparation 
associated with each of 12,000 occupations. 
The NMES Household Survey is a stratified random sample of the civilian non-
institutionalized population of the United States containing primarily individual-level data on the 
medical expenditures, demographic characteristics, employment status, and health insurance 
coverage of some 35,000 individuals in 14,000 households. Household Survey respondents who 
reported coverage from private insurance (6549 individuals) were re-interviewed in the HIPS to 
obtain more detailed information on their type and level of coverage, premiums, deductibles, 
maximum benefits and covered illnesses. The HIPS was designed to provide a random sample of 
all private health insurance policyholders in the civilian population of the United States at the 
end of 1987. The data available in HIPS further supplements the Household Survey data by 
providing detailed firm-level information on the characteristics of respondents’ employers as 
well as their employer-sponsored health insurance plans. 
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The 1987 NMES is well suited for our purposes because it contains data from a period 
when managed care organizations were relatively minor players in the health insurance market 
(HMOs comprise only about 1 percent of our estimation samples). This is important because we 
need easily quantifiable measures of the overall amount of insurance contained in each contract, 
something that is considerably harder to measure when insurers and health care providers are 
vertically integrated. 
One disadvantage of the HIPS data is that it yields a fairly small sample when one 
restricts attention to workers who hold employment-based health insurance polices who also 
meet other necessary criteria and provide complete data on all relevant variables. These small 
sample sizes limit the statistical power of our analysis, leading to less precision in our estimates 
that one would like. However, to our knowledge, the NMES/HIPS surveys are the only data sets 
available that would allow us to link measures of job attachment with detailed information on 
employment-based health insurance contracts. Given this limitation, our objective is to uncover 
consistent patterns in the data that are congruent with the predictions of our theoretical model. If 
the model’s predictions are upheld across a variety of specifications and dependent variables, this 
should bolster confidence that the effects we find are genuine, despite their being less precisely 
estimated than would be possible with a larger sample. 
B. Measuring Commitment / Job Attachment 
 To test the predictions of our model, we require an observable proxy for the degree of job 
attachment present in firms. A number of impediments to job mobility have been identified in the 
literature, with particular attention being focused on human capital specialization, which refers to 
the subset of a worker’s knowledge or skills which are differentially valued by a particular firm, 
or within a particular occupation or industry. In general, the more specialized one’s skills 
become, the costlier it will be to change employers. In the case of firm-specific training, these 
costs reflect reductions in productivity and earnings at rival firms.13 Alternatively, when skills 
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are occupation- or industry-specific, the transactions costs of changing employers may reflect 
either reduced productivity (if the switch entails leaving one’s occupation or industry), or simply 
the increased costs of finding a job as employment becomes more specialized. In the latter case, 
the costs of moving among employers may be high even in the absence of firm-specific 
training.14 
To proxy for job attachment (and by implication, the degree of commitment to a 
particular employment-based insurance pool), we use a measure from the DOT of the training 
specificity required in various occupations. The variable, known as “Specific Vocational 
Preparation” (SVP) is defined as, “the amount of time required to learn the techniques, acquire 
information, and develop the facility needed for average performance in a specific job-worker 
situation,” and is based on the nine categories of vocational preparation shown in Table 1.15 Note 
that SVP was not designed to measure the general educational requirements of jobs, because a 
separate variable (“General Educational Development”) is provided for that purpose.  
A proxy for worker-level job attachment was obtained by imputing an SVP value to each 
worker in the Household Survey. Because the Household Survey occupation codes are based on 
the occupation codes used in the 1980 Census (U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the 
Census 1987), it was possible to impute an SVP value to each worker using the Commerce 
Department’s Standard Occupational Classification (SOC) codes as a crosswalk.16 The DOT 
provides a finer occupational classification than the Census, so there were often multiple SVP 
values associated with each Census occupation code. To impute a unique SVP value to each 
Census occupation code, we took a simple average of the SVP values associated with each 
Census occupation. A list of representative occupations for each SVP quartile is provided in 
Table 2. 
The SVP variable, although perhaps not familiar to many readers, offers several 
advantages over other possible measures of job attachment. First, unlike job tenure or turnover, it 
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is not a function of the quality of health insurance offered by the respondent’s employer. Second, 
we are not using the actual amount of training received by a particular worker, which is also 
potentially endogenous, but rather the amount of training typically required in the worker’s 
occupation. These observations suggest that one can plausibly treat SVP as exogenous when 
considering the amount of insurance offered by a particular firm.  
At the level of an individual worker, SVP would appear to be a good proxy for job 
attachment. However, because decisions regarding health insurance are made at the firm level, 
the best conceptual measure for our purposes is one that measures job attachment at the firm 
level; that is, one measuring the average amount of job attachment in a particular firm. Given the 
need to obtain a firm-level measure, there were two ways in which we might have proceeded. 
One possibility was to simply use the SVP value assigned to each worker as a proxy for the 
average degree of employment specialization in that worker’s firm. This approach would have 
been desirable if we believed that within-firm human capital heterogeneity was not very large. 
An alternative approach, and the one adopted in this paper, was to construct a measure of the 
average degree of specialization in various industries, and use this as a proxy for the typical 
amount of specialization arising in particular firms within those industries. This latter approach 
will be preferable if, as appears likely, there is less skill heterogeneity across firms (in narrowly 
defined industries) than within firms. 
 To construct a measure of job attachment at the firm level, we first computed the average 
SVP value in each worker’s industry (labeled Industry SVP 1980) by averaging the SVP values 
by industry for all employed persons in the 1980 Census PUMS (5 percent sample). To control 
for income differences at the industry level, which may confound Industry SVP 1980 if more 
specialized training is associated with higher earnings, we also computed average income in each 
industry using the PUMS data. Because the industry codes in the NMES Household Survey are 
at the three-digit level (representing some 230 distinct industries), we believe that Industry SVP 
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1980 is likely to provide a good measure of the average amount of job attachment present in 
individual firms.  
One problem with this measure is that it is based on the distribution of occupations 
existing in 1980. If between 1980 and 1987 (the year of the NMES survey) there were important 
changes in the distribution of occupations within industries then Industry SVP 1980 will be 
subject to measurement error. To avoid this problem, we calculated a second job attachment 
variable, Industry SVP 1987, using the 18,000 persons in the NMES Household Survey who 
reported a Census occupation code.17 This variable captures the within-industry distribution of 
occupations that existed at the time of the survey. However, unlike Industry SVP 1980, which is 
based on millions of observations (and therefore thousands of observations per industry), 
Industry SVP 1987 is based on only 18,000 observations in total, so the number of observations 
per industry is quite small in some cases. As a result, Industry SVP 1987 may also be subject to 
measurement error. Since these two potential sources of measurement error should be unrelated, 
we will use both measures of job attachment in our analysis and examine the robustness of our 
findings across the two variables. In addition, we will re-estimate each model using Industry SVP 
1980 as an instrument for Industry SVP 1987. It is well known that the instrumental variables 
estimator remains consistent in the presence of a mis-measured explanatory variable, even in 
cases where the instrument itself is measured with error, provided there is not a common 
component to the measurement error across the two variables. 
C. Measures of Insurance 
 We use two standard contract provisions as measures of the amount of insurance 
available through each policy. The first is the lifetime limit on benefits, which is positively 
related to the amount of insurance coverage specified in a plan, and probably the best overall 
measure of the extent to which long-term, costly medical conditions are insured. The second is 
the annual stop-loss, defined as the threshold level of medical expenditures above which the 
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policyholder is no longer required to make co-payments. In contrast to the lifetime benefit caps, 
the annual stop-losses are less closely tied to catastrophic medical expenditures, but are more 
likely to be reached, and could therefore be viewed as a more immediately relevant measure of 
the amount of insurance contained in a plan. 
 We make use of these two contract provisions, in lieu of others (such as the annual 
deductible or the plan actuarial value) because we believe they map most directly to our 
theoretical model, which is fundamentally a model of insurance provision. We emphasize the 
word “insurance” because many health insurance plans combine prepaid medical care (i.e., care 
for common, low cost afflictions) with true “insurance,” by which we mean protection against 
less common, but significantly more costly, medical conditions. In particular, because our paper 
deals with the role of precommitment in maintaining viable risk pools, we would expect our 
measure of job attachment to matter most for insuring losses that require large, foreseeable cross 
subsidies from other members of the insurance pool. This is most likely to occur in cases where a 
coworker develops a serious medical condition that is both chronic in nature and costly to treat, 
such as diabetes, cancer, or heart disease. For such conditions, we would expect that the overall 
amount of financial protection conferred by the plan would be determined disproportionately by 
contract provisions that apply to the “right tail” of the loss distribution.18  
D. Estimation Samples 
To create our samples we applied a common set of restrictions to the 6549 HIPS 
respondents reporting employment-related health insurance coverage. Specifically, we dropped 
any person who was classified as unemployed, or for whom a link to a “current main job” was 
unavailable. We also dropped any person who did not hold an employer- (or union-) sponsored 
plan, and anyone whose employer did not offer group coverage, or who was employed by a 
sub-chapter S corporation.19 We also deleted a small number of persons who held policies from 
more than one employer. These restrictions, coupled with observations lost from missing or 
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incomplete data, resulted in final samples of 2038 policyholders for the lifetime benefit sample 
and 1898 policyholders for the annual stop-loss sample.  
 To control for factors other than job attachment which might affect the level of coverage 
provided under employment-based health insurance contracts, we include controls for type of 
coverage (single, two-party, family, or other), self-insurance status of the employer (fully self-
insured, partially self-insured, or commercial insurance), type of insurance (HMO or indemnity), 
type of employer (for profit, nonprofit, government, or other), region of the country (northeast, 
midwest, south, or west), urban location (SMSA or non-SMSA), firm size (indicator variables 
for: fewer than 10 employees, 10-25 employees, 26-100 employees, 101-500 employees, more 
than 500 employees), employer unionization (fully unionized, partially unionized, or non-union), 
and industry income.20 We include a measure of average industry income in all of our 
regressions to ensure that Industry SVP is not simply picking up income differences across 
industries that are potentially correlated with insurance purchases. In the stop-loss samples, we 
also include controls for whether the stop-loss applies to all covered expenses (or only the 
policyholder’s out-of-pocket expenses), and whether the annual deductible is counted toward the 
stop-loss.  
Summary statistics for the lifetime benefit and annual stop-loss samples are displayed in 
Tables 3 and 4, respectively. The mean lifetime benefit in 1987 was approximately $850,000, 
and there is substantial variation in these benefits; in our sample the range runs from a low of 
$10,000 to a high of $25,000,000. Although amounts below $50,000 may seem unusual, we have 
only included lifetime maximums that apply to coverage categories likely to yield high expenses, 
such as hospital room and board charges, inpatient surgical benefits, and inpatient physician fees. 
We imposed this restriction to ensure that these lower limits were limits for the policy as a whole 
and not for specialized types of care that sometimes have their own maximum benefits (such as 
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mental health or substance abuse treatment). Nonetheless, our results do not change if we 
eliminate maximum benefits below $50,000 or $100,000.  
The mean annual stop-loss is approximately $2400 and there is considerable variation in 
this variable as well. Here we have less reason to worry that the reported stop-losses do not apply 
to the policy as whole because there is generally only one stop-loss reported for each policy. 
Again, our results do not change if we drop potential outliers, such as values below $500 or 
above $25,000.  
There are a few other characteristics of the samples that are worth mentioning. For both 
the lifetime benefit and stop-loss samples, we see that roughly 60 percent of employers offer 
only one health insurance policy. About 45 percent of firms self-insure to some degree, and only 
about 1 percent of health plans are classified as HMOs. Approximately 70 percent of the firms 
are for-profit firms, roughly half have more than 500 employees, and about one third are either 
fully or partially unionized. 
E. Empirical Results 
The effect of job attachment on the amount of insurance coverage available from 
employment-based health insurance contracts can be estimated from a simple OLS regression of 
the type shown below: 
 0 1           i i i iInsurance Industry SVP X′= β + β + γ + ε            (6) 
where iX  is a vector of employer and insurance plan characteristics for worker i , iSVPIndustry  
is a proxy for the average degree of job attachment in the firm that employs worker i  (either 
Industry SVP 1980 or Industry SVP 1987), and iε  is a random error term. The dependent 
variable in our analysis, iInsurance , is a measure of the total amount of insurance coverage 
provided by the policyholder’s insurance contract (either the maximum lifetime benefit or the 
annual stop-loss).21 In terms of (6), the estimated value of 1β  provides a direct measure of the 
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effect of commitment on the amount of insurance provided by a given employment-based health 
insurance policy. To address the possibility that either Industry SVP 1980 or Industry SVP 1987 
could be measured with error, we estimate equation (6) using each variable separately and also 
using an instrumental variables (IV) procedure in which Industry SVP 1980 is used as an 
instrument for Industry SVP 1987. 
To examine the main predictions from our theoretical model, which concern the 
differential effects of job attachment in firms offering a single health insurance plan 
(“single-plan firms”) relative to firms offering multiple plans (“multiple-plan firms”), we will 
run (6) separately for both types of firms. To test for significant differences between the two, we 
will also run a difference-in-differences model on the pooled sample of all firms, as shown in 
equation (7) below 
 0 1 2
3
           
                                                          (   )    
i i i
i i i i
Insurance Industry SVP Single Plan
Single Plan Industry SVP X
= β + β + β
′+ β × + γ + ε
    (7) 
where iPlanSingle  is a dummy variable indicating that worker i ’s employer offers a single 
health insurance policy.22 Observe that 2β  captures the mean difference in insurance coverage 
between single- and multiple-plan firms, while 3β  measures the differential effect of job 
attachment in firms offering a single policy relative to firms offering multiple policies. When the 
lifetime maximum benefit is the dependent variable, our theoretical model implies that 02 <β  
since, all else equal, single-plan firms should offer less insurance than multiple-plan firms. More 
importantly, we would expect 03 >β  since the effect of job attachment on the quantity of 
insurance should be larger in firms offering a single policy than in firms offering multiple 
policies.23 Notice that these predictions are reversed when the annual stop-loss is the dependent 
variable because a lower stop-loss translates into more insurance coverage.  
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E.1 Lifetime Benefits. Results for lifetime benefits are presented in Table 5. Columns (1)-(6) 
display estimates of Equation (6); Columns (1)-(3) are based on a sample of firms offering a 
single health insurance plan, while Columns (4)-(6) pertain to firms offering multiple plans. In 
each case, separate estimates are presented for Industry SVP 1980 and Industry SVP 1987 to 
provide a check on the robustness of our results with respect to the two potential sources of 
measurement error discussed earlier. In addition, in Columns (3) and (6) an instrumental 
variables model is estimated in which Industry SVP 1980 is used to instrument for Industry SVP 
1987. 
Looking at single- and multiple-plan firms separately, we see that the data are consistent 
with the predictions of our theoretical model. Focusing on the results for Industry SVP 1980, we 
see that a one-unit increase in job attachment increases the lifetime maximum benefit by 
approximately $122,000 in single-plan firms, but by only $20,000 in multiple-plan firms. For 
single-plan firms, this effect is statistically significant at the 11 percent level, 24 while in 
multiple-plan firms the hypothesis that the effect of job attachment is zero cannot be rejected 
with any reasonable level of confidence. As can be seen from Column (2), results are similar, but 
more precisely estimated, when Industry SVP 1987 is used to proxy for job attachment. A 
similar, albeit less precisely estimated, coefficient is obtained using the IV model shown in 
Column (3).25 The consistency of the point estimates across these alternative specifications, (in 
both the single- and multiple-plan samples), suggests that measurement error is not a large 
problem in this case. 
To gain some perspective on the magnitude of these effects, observe that in single-plan 
firms a one standard deviation increase in Industry SVP 1980 raises the maximum lifetime 
benefit by roughly $88,000. Relative to the mean lifetime benefit in our sample, this represents a 
10 percent increase in available health insurance benefits over one’s lifetime. 
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To further examine the predictions of our theoretical model, we next turn to the 
difference-in-differences models shown in Columns (7) and (8). Again focusing on Industry SVP 
1980, we can check for consistency between the results from this specification, which pools 
single- and multiple-plan firms, and the more general (but less efficient) specifications that 
examine each type of firm separately. First, note that given the way the difference-in-differences 
model is specified, the intercept in Column (7) corresponds to the mean lifetime benefit in 
multiple-plan firms and is virtually identical to the corresponding estimate from Column (4). The 
mean lifetime benefit for single-plan firms can be calculated from the difference-in-differences 
model by adding the intercept term to the coefficient on the Single Plan Firm indicator; doing so 
yields a mean benefit of $311,576, which is fairly close to the mean benefit of $271,759 shown 
in Column (1). Similarly, the effect of job attachment in multiple-plan firms is given by the 
coefficient on Industry SVP, which is small and not statistically different from zero at any 
reasonable level of significance. The effect of job attachment in single-plan firms is given by the 
sum of the coefficient on Industry SVP and the coefficient on the interaction variable, Single 
Plan Firm × Industry SVP. Adding these coefficients yields a value of $131,391, which is again 
quite close to the corresponding estimate of $121,758 from Column (1). Thus, the difference-in-
differences model appears to yield similar estimates to those obtained when single- and multiple-
plan firms are considered separately. 
The difference-in-differences specification provides a natural framework for testing the 
predictions of our theoretical model. As discussed previously, we would expect the coefficient 
on Single Plan Firm to be negative because our model predicts that, ceteris paribus, single-plan 
firms should offer less insurance than multiple-plan firms. In addition, the coefficient on the 
interaction variable, Single Plan Firm × Industry SVP, should be positive since the effect of job 
attachment should be more pronounced in firms offering a single insurance policy.  
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Focusing again on Industry SVP 1980, we find that both of these predictions are upheld. 
All else equal, lifetime benefits are approximately $662,000 lower in single-plan firms. 
Furthermore, a one-unit increase in Industry SVP 1980 raises lifetime benefits by approximately 
$140,000 more in single-plan firms than in multiple-plan firms (where the effect of job 
attachment is found to be negligible). These differences are statistically significant at the 15 
percent level using a two-tailed test and at the 7.5 percent level using a one-tailed test.26 As 
shown in Column (8), larger and more statistically significant differences are found when 
Industry SVP 1987 is used as our measure of job attachment. 
E.2 Annual Stop-Losses. The annual stop-losses provide a useful complement to our lifetime 
benefit results for two reasons. First, one might argue that the lifetime coverage limits are less 
relevant than other contract provisions because they are often set at sufficiently high levels that 
they are unlikely to be breached. Although this argument would be hard to justify on theoretical 
grounds (given that low probability, catastrophic events deliver the largest utility gains per dollar 
spent), or on empirical grounds (since we find substantial variation in the limits in our sample), it 
is nonetheless useful to examine a contractual provision that “bites” at a lower point in the loss 
distribution. The stop-losses are also of interest because they apply on an annual, as opposed to a 
lifetime, basis. This allows for an additional check on the robustness of our findings. 
 Results for the annual stop-losses are shown in Table 6. We proceed in exactly the same 
fashion as in the previous section, with two differences. First, the nature of the stop-loss 
provisions requires that two additional control variables be added to our regressions: an indicator 
variable for whether the stop-loss applies to all covered expenses or only the policyholder’s 
out-of-pocket expenses; and an indicator for whether the annual deductible is counted toward the 
stop-loss.27 Second, being that a lower stop-loss is associated with more insurance coverage, the 
predicted signs of the coefficients from Equations (6) and (7) are reversed. Specifically, we 
would expect that the coefficient on Industry SVP should be negative and larger in absolute value 
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for single-plan firms than for multiple-plan firms. In the difference-in-differences models, we 
would expect the Single Plan Firm dummy to carry a positive coefficient (consistent with single-
plan firms offering less insurance, ceteris paribus), while the Single Plan Firm × Industry SVP 
interaction variable should be negative (indicating that job attachment lowers stop-losses by 
more in single-plan firms). 
 Both of these implications are supported by the data. Focusing on Industry SVP 1980, a 
comparison of Columns (1) and (4) reveals a negative effect of job attachment on stop-losses in 
firms offering a single health insurance policy, but not in firms that offer multiple policies.28 The 
coefficient on Industry SVP in Column (1) implies that a one standard deviation increase in 
Industry SVP lowers the annual stop-loss by approximately $240. Relative to a mean stop-loss of 
$2400, this represents a 10 percent reduction in the threshold set for limiting a policyholder’s 
annual loss exposure. The difference-in-differences estimates reported in Column (7) are 
consistent with single-plan firms having significantly higher stop-losses that are more negatively 
related to job attachment, as implied by our model. These differences are statistically significant 
at the 13 percent and 10 percent levels based on a two-tailed test, and at the 6.5 percent and 
5 percent levels based on a one-tailed test. As in the case of the lifetime limits, the coefficients in 
the difference-in-differences model are more precisely estimated when Industry SVP 1987 is 
used to proxy for job attachment. 
 One potential difficulty that arises with the stop-loss sample is that not all policies 
contain an annual stop-loss. This was not an issue with the lifetime maximums because virtually 
all of the contracts in our sample specified a maximum benefit. In the case of the stop-losses, 
there were approximately 350 policyholders whose contracts did not contain an annual stop-loss. 
In the previous regressions, we dropped these observations from the sample. To examine 
whether our results are sensitive to this choice, we attempted to estimate our 
difference-in-differences model with a Heckman selection correction, but were unable to obtain 
25 
convergence (regardless of the optimization algorithm chosen). Such an approach would have 
been suspect in any case since identification would have been achieved solely based on the 
differing functional forms of the two equations. A priori, it is extremely difficult to think of an 
explanatory variable that would be correlated with whether a stop-loss provision is specified in 
an insurance policy that would not also influence the magnitude of the stop-loss. 
 As an alternative, we estimated a Tobit model that treated contracts without a stop-loss as 
being right censored. The rationale for this approach is that an insurance policy without a 
stop-loss provision can be viewed as having an “effective” stop-loss of infinity, i.e. there is no 
expenditure threshold at which the policyholder’s loss exposure is truncated. If policyholders (or 
their employers) might have chosen a policy containing a stop-loss had a larger stop-loss been 
available (rather than opting for an implicit stop-loss of infinity), then it seems reasonable to treat 
the missing observations as being right censored. Because this approach leaves open the question 
of where the censor point lies, we decided to set it at the highest stop-loss observed in our 
sample, which was $62,500. As a sensitivity check, we estimated a second model that dropped 
this observation and set the censor point at $25,000, the second highest stop-loss in our sample. 
In each case, we obtained results that were virtually identical to those reported in Columns (7) 
and (8) of Table 6. This provides some evidence that omitting these observations from our earlier 
regressions did not bias our coefficient estimates. 
4. Conclusions 
 In many insurance settings it may be argued that private information, and the attendant 
problem of adverse selection, is the primary cause of market failure. The evidence increasingly 
suggests, however, that the market for health insurance is more accurately characterized as one in 
which participants possess symmetric information regarding the evolving health status of 
insurance purchasers. The key ingredient for a successful health insurance package is to have 
26 
those who turn out to be healthier than average agree to cross-subsidize the members of the pool 
who are less fortunate. But, as illustrated by the increasing use of re-underwriting in the 
individual health insurance market, the inability of low risks to precommit to remain in the 
insurance pool may eliminate the ability to insure against the classification risk that results when 
premiums are adjusted to reflect observed health status. 
 The evidence presented in this paper demonstrates the importance of precommitment in 
the provision of long-term health insurance. When insurance is bundled with employment, we 
find that frictions in worker mobility impart a de-facto commitment to employment-based 
insurance pools that can be exploited to provide more complete insurance of health risks than 
would be available in a competitive market. In the absence of such a commitment device, 
insurers anticipate that the healthier individuals would, over time, exit the insurance pool in order 
to obtain coverage at more favorable terms elsewhere. Thus, the ability of insurers to offer 
benefit packages which insure individuals against the classification risk associated with changes 
in their health status is enhanced when workers experience an attachment to their job that 
impedes their exit from the pool. 
 Consistent with this view, we find that the amount of coverage provided under 
employment-based health insurance contracts is increasing in the degree of worker commitment. 
The measures of coverage that we consider in the analysis are the lifetime coverage cap, and the 
stop-loss amounts, since these are the contract provisions most likely to be encountered by 
individuals who have chronic, long-term illnesses, and whose costs of treatment are likely to 
result in higher premiums for the healthier members of the group. As predicted by the theoretical 
model, we find that the distortions in coverage are most pronounced in cases where firms offer a 
single insurance contract to all of their workers. In contrast, the coverages associated with 
multiple-plan benefit packages, which permit the voluntary experience-rating of premiums 
through the selection of contracts by insureds, are much less sensitive to job attachment.  
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 Our results indicate that, in addition to the advantages conferred by preferential tax 
treatment, employer-sponsored health insurance is also attractive because the bundling of 
insurance with employment results in a more stable, and therefore insurable, risk pool. If 
employment were to become less stable or the incentive to invest in job-specific skills were to 
decline, insurers would need to utilize institutions other than employer sponsorship to craft 
insurable risk pools. From a policy perspective, our results suggest caution when considering 
proposals that might weaken the link between health insurance and employment.29  
 At a broader level, our findings support the view that limitations on insured commitment 
are a potentially important impediment to the implementation of the long-term contracts required 
to fully insure chronic illnesses. Thus, our results also provide a glimpse into the often hidden 
costs of unreliable contract enforcement. 
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Appendix 
Theorem 1 (Optimal Pooling Packages):  
There exist K1 and K2, where K2>K1>0, such that 
(i) for K<K1, pooling is not possible since low-risk insureds will always prefer 
the outside insurance option; 
(ii)  for K2>K≥K1, an optimal pooling package can retain low-risk insureds, and 
in characterized by the following conditions: 
(a) Π( )C P = 0 ;  
  (b) ;SR p <  
 (c) The feasibility constraint (4) is satisfied with equality; 
(iii) for 2KK ≥ , the full-commitment contract C* is attained. 
Proof of Theorem 1: 
 An optimal pooling contract is obtained by maximizing the following Lagrangean 
expression with respect to Z p  and R p : 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ){ }SpKYUpcvCCVL LLpP −−−++= ;βΠα  (A-1) 
where   α  and   β  are undetermined multipliers and CP ≡ {c, c} denotes a pooling contract in 
which c ≡ {ZP, RP}. The first order conditions for an interior maximum are given by 
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 Assuming, for the moment, that an interior solution to (A-1) exists, equation (A-3) 
implies     α > 0 from which (ii)(a) follows. Also, solving (A-2) for α  and substituting the result 
into (A-3) yields 
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Since  0 , >< βpp L  implies (ii)(b) and (ii)(c).   
 Finally, it is straightforward to demonstrate that, for sufficiently small values of K, there 
exist no pooling packages preferred by the low-risk agents to their outside option, (part (i)), and 
that, for sufficiently large amounts of commitment,     β = 0 and the full commitment contract 
solves (A-1), (part (iii)). 
     QED 
 
Theorem 2 (Optimal Multi-Contract Packages):  
An optimal insurance package C≡{cH, cL} is characterized by the following 
conditions: 
(i)  for K<K2 , cH ≠ cL and 
(a) The feasibility constraint (4) and the self-selection constraint (5) hold with 
equality; 
(b)  and pcpc LLHH );(0);( ππ << ;0)( =Π C  
(c)  RH = S > RL. 
(ii) for K ≥ K2, cH = cL and the full-commitment contract C* is obtained. 
Proof of Theorem 2: 
 The Lagrangean expression associated with the maximization problem is written as 
)},;();({)}();({)()( HLHHLLL pcvpcv SpKYUpcvCCVL −+−−−++= γβΠα  
where C ≡ {cH, cL} and ci ≡ {Zi, Ri} for i ∈ {H, L}. The first order conditions for an interior 
solution are 
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 Equation (A-6) implies that α > 0, so Π (C ) = 0. For K K≥ 2 , both the feasibility (4) and 
self-selection (5) constraints are slack, so β = γ = 0 and C* is attained. When K K< 2 , a solution 
requires β > 0 and γ > 0 (establishing i(a)). 
 Solving (A-5) for λα and substituting the result into (A-6) gives the result that R SH = .  
Similarly, solving (A-7) for α (1 - λ) and substituting the result into (A-8) yields 
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which implies that R SL <  whenever γ > 0, establishing i (c). The final part of i (b) is an 
implication of (a), (c) and the fact that 0C =)(Π .  
  QED 
 
 
Theorem 3:  
Firms which offer a single insurance contract to their workforce should have lower 
levels of coverage that are more sensitive to worker commitment than firms which 
offer multi-contract packages. Thus, ip RR <  , and 
dK
dR
dK
dR ip
>  , for { }LHi ,∈ . 
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Proof of Theorem 3: 
Since RH = S, it follows immediately that 0    =>
dK
dR
dK
dR HP . The rest of the proof will 
demonstrate that 
dK
dR
dK
dR LP   > .  
The contract CP is characterized by the conditions 
 ,0=− PP RpZ  and (A-9) 
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It is straightforward to demonstrate that (A-11) is positive at CP, since LV  is flatter than the 
pooling zero profit locus, (A-9). 
 The contract CL is characterized by the conditions 
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where ,  , LLLS
HH RSZYWZYW +−−≡−≡  and .LLN ZYW −≡  Solving (A-4) for Z
H, 
substituting the result into (A-13), and totally differentiating yields 
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which is the slope of the AC* locus depicted in Figure 4. Total differentiation of (A-14) gives the 
result that 
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To demonstrate the desired result, we must show that the denominator of (A-16) is greater than 
the denominator of (A-11). This difference may be written as 
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 By (A-10) and (A-14), it follows that 112 =EE , so that (A-17) reduces to 
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Since the L-type’s indifference curve is steeper at CP than at CL, the term in the inner set of 
brackets is positive. Thus, to complete the proof, it is sufficient to demonstrate that p
dR
dZ
L
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where ).(')()(')(')( LN
HL
S
HH
3 WUp1WUpWU1E −++−≡ λλ  The numerator in (A-19) may be 
written as 
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HL
S
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which is greater than  
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S WUWU >  We may then write (A-20) as  
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LH WUWUppλλ  
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since LH pp > , and the concavity of U and (A-13) imply that ).(')(' HLS WUWU >  
Thus, 03 >E  implies that (A-19) is positive, and the proof of Theorem 3 is complete. 
 QED 
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1.  This process is empirically documented in a convincing study by Altman, Cutler, and 
Zeckhauser (1998) which examines the changing enrollments for individuals insured 
through the Group Insurance Commission of Massachusetts.  
 
2.  To mitigate this problem, Cochrane (1995) proposes the use of specially designated 
accounts into which consumers who find out that they are healthier than average pay an 
amount equal to the resulting expected decline in their future health care expenditures, 
while those receiving adverse health news receive a lump sum subsidy from the fund 
equivalent to the present value of their increased health care costs. As long as these 
severance payments are enforceable, the result is that all consumers pay the same present 
value of premiums and, at each point in time (after the lump sum payments have been 
implemented), face a premium equal to their expected actuarial cost. 
 
3.  Hendel and Lizzeri (forthcoming) and Chiappori (2000) provide nice overviews of recent 
developments in the empirical contracting literature. 
 
4.  “In theory, health insurance could be sold for the long term on a level premium basis. In 
practice, matters will be more complex. Much health insurance is now bundled with the 
provision of care. If an individual left a geographic region, he might have to change 
provider, and no new provider/insurer would want to take him at his old level rate. 
Portability is but one problem. Once individuals purchase lifetime medical insurance, 
why should an insurer strive for efficiency when people are stuck in his plan? This 
problem is exacerbated since the insurer must agree to pay for or provide a changing 
level of services. Health insurance policies optimally change from year to year, as 
medical technology improves and knowledge about optimal treatments expands. Finally, 
with future medical costs so unpredictable, insurers cannot take on the risk, which would 
apply to all policies, that costs will escalate beyond expectation. With life insurance, by 
contrast, portability, changing service mix, and varying costs are not problems.” (Cutler 
and Zeckhauser 2000, 627) 
 
5.  See Epstein (1997) for a discussion of the legal problems associated with enforcing long-
term insurance contracts. A concise summary of the problem can be found in Cochrane 
(1995, 468), who notes that, “... courts often reinterpret insurance contracts ex post, judge 
the merits of each clause separately rather than how the clauses fit together to form a 
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reasonable contract, and will not enforce severance payments or bond forfeitures against 
consumers.” 
 
6.  When workers are free to choose among plans, inducing self-selection is necessary even 
with observable types. 
 
7.  But, as noted in the anecdote provided in the introduction, some individual health 
insurance providers have been forced to re-underwrite in order to keep the lower risk 
customers in the insurance pool. The problem, of course, is that in the individual market 
there are not significant transactions costs incurred by low risk individuals who wish to 
exit the pool.  
 
8.  Formally, we must have v(pL, cL) ≥ v(pL, cH) as well. We ignore this constraint since it 
is never binding. 
 
9.  The zero profit constraint (3) allows for the possibility that either the insurer or the 
employer may wish to cross subsidize the premiums associated with the two contracts. 
For insurers, this would be possible in cases where both contracts are issued by the same 
insurance company. In 1997, over half of all employers who offered multiple policies did 
so through a single insurer (Marquis and Long 1999; Encinosa 2001). Alternatively, the 
employer could pay the actuarially fair premium for each contract and vary employee 
premium contributions to effect the desired level of cross subsidization. Of course, it may 
be that neither the insurer nor the employer wishes to implement cross subsidized 
premiums, in which case Equation (3) will still hold since, in the absence of cross 
subsidization, each contract will earn zero profits individually. 
 
10.  Note that these three conditions define a class of contractual pairs which consist of a full-
coverage contract for high risks, a partial coverage contract for low risks located on AC* 
which is equally valued by the high risks, and which together make zero profit on 
average. One element of this class is the contract which awards the allocation “A” to low 
risks and Hĉ to high risks. These contracts are located on the same high-risk indifference 
curve and correspond to the well-known Rothschild-Stiglitz separating allocation, where 
each contract makes zero profit. These are the contracts we would expect to observe 
when there is no mechanism for effecting cross subsidization within the pool, as would 
be the case, for example, if Hc and Lc were issued by different insurers and employee 
premium contributions were not adjusted by the employer. When cross subsidization is 
possible, the low risk contract migrates toward c* along the AC* locus and the high risk 
contract (on the same Hv indifference curve) moves from Hĉ  toward c* as the magnitude 
of the cross subsidy increases. One such contract is that denoted as {cH, cL} in Figure 4, 
where profit earned on low-risk individuals subsidizes losses incurred on the contract 
sold to higher risks. The limiting case occurs when both contracts coincide at the pooling 
allocation c*. As indicated in Theorem 2, the participation constraint for low risks 
implies that not all of the members of this class of contracts (in particular, those in the 
vicinity of c*) are feasible. 
 
11.  The reason, of course, is that the multi-contract package, which is a second-best 
contractual response to the feasibility constraint (4), entails distortions in two margins, 
exposing the insured to both financial risk and classification risk. In contrast, the single 
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(pooling) contract loads all of the distortion into financial risk while eliminating 
completely the insured’s exposure to the risk of reclassification. As is often the case in 
second-best settings, the optimal response to the presence of a constraint involves small 
distortions in all of the choice variables, as opposed to a large distortion in only one. 
While multi-contract benefit packages are generically superior, many firms may not have 
sufficient enrollment to support more than a single plan. 
 
12.  Note that the cross-subsidization from low risks to high risks inherent in the optimal 
multi-contract package provides another reason why employer-sponsored health 
insurance may be desirable. Such a subsidy would be quite difficult to effect were 
insurance provided to workers in a competitive market environment, since in such a 
setting insurers would always have the incentive to drop the unprofitable contract being 
sold to high risks, and competitors could always offer a superior contract (for example, 
Lĉ , depicted in Figure 3) to low risks. By providing insurance to workers, the employers 
can collect the efficient cross-subsidized premiums from the insureds and then purchase 
insurance coverage from outside insurers at actuarially fair rates ( iẐ ) for each type. 
Alternatively, the insurers themselves could effect the desired level of cross subsidization 
in cases where both contracts are issued by the same insurance company.  
 
13.  Available evidence suggests that the returns to specialized training are substantial. Topel 
(1991, 147), for example, finds that, “10 years of job seniority raises the wage of the 
typical male worker in the United States by over 25 percent relative to what he could 
obtain elsewhere.” 
 
14.  To take one example, consider an academic health economist and a retail sales worker, 
both living in Syracuse, New York. Although neither person has significant firm-specific 
human capital, the set of employment opportunities available in the Syracuse area is quite 
limited for the health economist, but not for the retail worker. In order to find a 
comparable employment opportunity elsewhere, the health economist would almost 
certainly have to re-locate—a process that is both time-consuming and costly—whereas 
the retail worker is likely to have many employment opportunities that would not require 
relocation. The difference between the two stems from the more specialized nature of 
employment for academic economists which, although not based on firm-specific human 
capital per se, is related to their having more specialized training overall.  
 
15.  The complete definition of SVP is as follows: This [SVP] represents the amount of time 
required to learn the techniques, acquire information, and develop the facility needed for 
average performance in a specific worker-job situation. The training may be acquired in a 
school, work, military, institutional, or vocational environment. It does not include 
orientation training required of even every fully qualified worker to become accustomed 
to the special conditions of any new job. Specific vocational training includes training 
given in any of the following circumstances: (a) Vocational education (such as high 
school commercial or shop training, technical school, art school, and that part of college 
training which is organized around a specific vocational objective); (b) Apprentice 
training (for apprenticeable jobs only); (c) In-plant training (given by an employer in the 
form of organized classroom study); (d) On-the-job training (serving as learner or trainee 
on the job under the instruction of qualified worker); (e) Essential experience in other 
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jobs (serving in less responsible jobs which lead to the higher grade job or serving in 
other jobs that qualify). 
 
16.  The SOC codes are the occupational analogue of the well-known Standard Industrial 
Classification (SIC) codes. 
 
17.  To preserve comparability, we also calculated a measure of average industry income 
using this group of workers.  
 
18.  In our sample, the average annual deductible is approximately $150 (in 1987 dollars). 
Actuarial values measure the fraction of medical expenditures reimbursed by the plan for 
the average person in the population. Thus, for a representative individual (who will have 
low medical expenses), a generous plan is one that provides a lot of “first-dollar” 
coverage, even if it omits coverage for catastrophic illnesses which, due to their low 
likelihood of occurrence, do not affect expected medical expenses very much. However, 
from an insurance perspective, it is exactly these low probability, high expenditure 
conditions that risk averse individuals will most want to insure. This illustrates why the 
actuarial value is not a particularly good measure of insurance coverage, even though it 
may accurately reflect plan generosity in a different sense. 
 
19.  Sub-chapter S corporations have much higher lifetime limits than other types of firms (an 
average of $1,543,848 vs. $857,297 for the entire sample), perhaps due to the large 
number of physicians who incorporate themselves in this way. Including S corporations 
in our sample distorts our results unless their mean effect is controlled with an indicator 
variable. Unfortunately, the NMES variable for firm ownership type contains so many 
missing observations that our samples sizes are cut by roughly a third when we use this 
variable, reducing the precision of our estimates substantially. However, the coefficient 
estimates on the variables of interest are little changed when we include S corporations in 
our sample and control for their influence with a dummy variable. 
 
20.  We control for plan- and firm-level variables, rather than person-specific characteristics, 
because it is unlikely that the characteristics of a particular policyholder would influence 
the attributes of a group health insurance policy. Recent work suggests that the set of 
insurance plans offered by employers, as well as the provisions of the offered plans, are 
determined by the preferences of the workforce as a whole (Moran, Chernew, and Hirth 
2001; Bundorf 2002).  
 
21.  Because Industry SVP is measured at the industry level, while the dependent variable and 
other explanatory variables are measured at the firm level, it is possible that our 
regression residuals could be correlated within industries. To allow for this possibility, 
we implement a variant of the standard error correction proposed by Moulton (1986) 
using the CLUSTER command in STATA. This command also adjusts the standard 
errors for heteroscedasticity using White’s procedure (White 1980). 
 
22.  IV estimation of Equation (7), analogous to that used for Equation (6), is not possible 
because of the need to employ multiple instruments once the effect of Industry SVP is 
allowed to vary across single- and multiple-plan firms. However, as we will see, the 
estimates obtained from Equation (7) will generally be consistent with those from 
Equation (6). 
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23.  Recall from Theorem 3 that these predictions hold regardless of which contract ( Hc  or 
Lc ) is held by respondents in multiple-plan firms. 
 
24.  Because our model makes a monotonic prediction about the effect of job attachment on 
insurance coverage in single-contract firms, it is appropriate to use a one-tailed 
significance test. Based on a one-tailed test, we can reject the hypothesis that Industry 
SVP 1980 has a non-positive effect on lifetime benefits at the 0.055 level of significance. 
 
25.  The partial F-statistics shown at the bottom of Columns (3) and (6) indicate that Industry 
SVP 1980 is a very good instrument for Industry SVP 1987. 
 
26.  As mentioned previously, the monotonic nature of both predictions permits us to use one-
tailed tests for hypothesis testing. 
 
27.  Our results are virtually identical if we incorporate the deductible into the dependent 
variable, where appropriate. The principal advantage of using an indicator variable on the 
right-hand side of the regression is that it avoids problems associated with measurement 
error and/or non-reporting of deductibles by instead controlling for their mean effect on 
the dependent variable. 
 
28.  These conclusions continue to hold when Industry SVP 1987 is used in lieu of Industry 
SVP 1980, and when Industry SVP 1987 is instrumented with Industry SVP 1980. 
 
29.  The American Medical Association (and others) have argued for de-coupling health 
insurance from employment by eliminating the preferential tax treatment afforded 
employer-sponsored policies (Dickey 1998). More recently, some benefits specialists 
have advocated a “defined contribution” approach to health insurance whereby workers 
would be provided with a voucher to purchase insurance in the individual market (Trude 
and Ginsburg 2000). 
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Table 1. Specific Vocational Preparation (SVP) 
 
Description Numerical Value 
Short demonstration 1 
Anything beyond a short demonstration up to and including 30 days. 2 
Over 30 days up to and including 3 months. 3 
Over 3 months up to and including 6 months. 4 
Over 6 months up to and including 1 year. 5 
Over 1 year up to and including 2 years. 6 
Over 2 years up to and including 4 years. 7 
Over 4 years up to and including 10 years. 8 
Over 10 years. 9 
Source: The 1977 Dictionary of Occupational Titles. 
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Table 2. Representative Occupations by SVP Quartile 
 
SVP Quartile 1 (1.00-3.43) 
Cashiers Teachers 
Duplicating Machine Operators Library Clerks 
Mail Carriers, Postal Service Legislators 
Waiters and Waitresses Textile Sewing Machine Operators 
Farm Workers Timber Cutting and Logging Occupations 
Construction Laborers Machinery Maintenance Occupations 
Truck Drivers, Light Sheetmetal Duct Installers 
Garbage Collectors Railroad Brake, Signal, and Switch Operators 
Messengers Machine Feeders and Offbearers 
Janitors and Cleaners Production Inspectors, Checkers, and Examiners 
  
SVP Quartile 2 (3.43-5.29) 
Receptionists Licensed Practical Nurses 
Stenographers Peripheral Equipment Operators 
Traffic, Shipping, and Receiving Clerks Production Coordinators 
Billing Clerks Bill and Account Collectors 
Dispatchers Longshore Equipment Operators 
Correctional Institution Officers Mining Machine Operators 
Bus Drivers Optical Goods Workers 
Stock and Inventory Clerks Lathe and Turning Machine Operators 
Guides Hand Engraving and Printing Occupations 
Welfare Service Aides Inspectors, Agricultural Products 
  
SVP Quartile 3 (5.29-6.94) 
Buyers, Wholesale and Retail Trade Personnel, Training, and Labor Relations Specialists 
Real Estate Sales Occupations Drafting Occupations 
Broadcast Equipment Operators Science Technicians 
Supervisors, Forestry and Logging Workers Power Plant Operators 
Insurance Adjusters, Examiners, and Investigators Supervisors, General Office 
Horticultural Specialty Farmers Advertising and Related Sales Occupations 
Social Workers Adjusters and Calibrators 
Precision Assemblers, Metal Ship Captains and Mates, except Fishing Boats 
Precision Grinders, Fitters, and Tool Sharpeners Electrical and Electronic Equipment Assemblers 
Heat Treating Equipment Operators Supervisors and Proprietors, Sales Occupations 
  
SVP Quartile 4 (6.94-8.29) 
Administrators and Officials, Public Administration Chief Executives and General Administrators 
Purchasing Managers Personnel and Labor Relations Managers 
Managers, Properties and Real Estate Architects 
Underwriters Aerospace Engineers 
Archivists and Curators Nuclear Engineers 
Urban Planners Technical Writers 
Clergy Supervisors, Production Occupations 
Designers Supervisors, Police and Detectives 
Managers, Marketing, Advertising, and Public Relations Supervisors, Extractive Occupations 
Tool and Die Makers Air Traffic Controllers 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the Commerce Department’s Standard Occupational Classification (SOC) 
codes and data from the Household Survey and the 1980 Census. 
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Table 3. Summary Statistics for Maximum Benefit Sample 
 
 Mean Minimum Maximum 
Maximum Benefit (Lifetime) 857,297 
[833,969] 
10,000 25,000,000 
Industry SVP 1980 5.058 
[0.725] 
3.019 6.774 
Industry SVP 1987 5.206 
[0.734] 
3.111 7.037 
Single Plan Firm 0.603 
[0.489] 
0.000 1.000 
Single Plan Firm x Industry SVP 1980 3.006 
[2.508] 
0.000 6.765 
Single Plan Firm x Industry SVP 1987 3.081 
[2.571] 
0.000 7.037 
Two Party Policy 0.062 
[0.242] 
0.000 1.000 
Family Policy 0.532 
[0.499] 
0.000 1.000 
Other Policy 0.017 
[0.128] 
0.000 1.000 
Self Insured Policy 0.434 
[0.496] 
0.000 1.000 
Partially Self Insured Policy 0.039 
[0.193] 
0.000 1.000 
Policy is an HMO 0.010 
[0.101] 
0.000 1.000 
Nonprofit Organization 0.122 
[0.327] 
0.000 1.000 
Government Organization 0.168 
[0.374] 
0.000 1.000 
Other Organization 0.021 
[0.142] 
0.000 1.000 
Midwest 0.252 
[0.434] 
0.000 1.000 
South 0.423 
[0.494] 
0.000 1.000 
West 0.159 
[0.366] 
0.000 1.000 
Urban Location 0.683 
[0.466] 
0.000 1.000 
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Table 3 (cont.). Summary Statistics for Maximum Benefit Sample 
 
 Mean Minimum Maximum 
Small Firm (10–25 employees) 0.076 
[0.265] 
0.000 1.000 
Medium Firm (26–100 employees) 0.136 
[0.343] 
0.000 1.000 
Big Firm (101–500 employees) 0.212 
[0.409] 
0.000 1.000 
Huge Firm (more than 500 employees) 0.532 
[0.499] 
0.000 1.000 
Partially Unionized Firm 0.319 
[0.466] 
0.000 1.000 
Fully Unionized Firm 0.010 
[0.101] 
0.000 1.000 
Industry Income (1000s of dollars) 22.420 
[5.716] 
7.400 40.321 
Notes: The sample consists of 2038 persons who purchased health insurance policies through their 
employer. Standard deviations are in brackets. 
Source: Authors’ calculations using data on employer and health plan characteristics from the 1987 National 
Medical Expenditure Survey (NMES) and data on specific vocational preparation (SVP) from the 1977 
Dictionary of Occupational Titles.  
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Table 4. Summary Statistics for Stop-Loss Sample 
 
 Mean Minimum Maximum 
Annual Stop-Loss 2397 
[2944] 
150 62,500 
Industry SVP 1980 5.080 
[0.731] 
3.019 6.774 
Industry SVP 1987 5.231 
[0.733] 
3.111 7.037 
Single Plan Firm 0.597 
[0.491] 
0.000 1.000 
Single Plan Firm x Industry SVP 1980 3.008 
[2.532] 
0.000 6.765 
Single Plan Firm x Industry SVP 1987 3.079 
[2.594] 
0.000 7.037 
Stop-Loss Based on Covered Expenses 0.502 
[0.500] 
0.000 1.000 
Stop-Loss Includes Deductible 0.249 
[0.433] 
0.000 1.000 
Two Party Policy 0.048 
[0.215] 
0.000 1.000 
Family Policy 0.537 
[0.499] 
0.000 1.000 
Other Policy 0.014 
[0.118] 
0.000 1.000 
Self Insured Policy 0.412 
[0.492] 
0.000 1.000 
Partially Self Insured Policy 0.033 
[0.179] 
0.000 1.000 
Policy is an HMO 0.007 
[0.082] 
0.000 1.000 
Nonprofit Organization 0.123 
[0.329] 
0.000 1.000 
Government Organization 0.167 
[0.373] 
0.000 1.000 
Other Organization 0.021 
[0.144] 
0.000 1.000 
Midwest 0.232 
[0.422] 
0.000 1.000 
South 0.409 
[0.492] 
0.000 1.000 
West 0.154 
[0.361] 
0.000 1.000 
Urban Location 0.703 
[0.457] 
0.000 1.000 
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Table 4 (cont.). Summary Statistics for Stop-Loss Sample 
 
 Mean Minimum Maximum 
Small Firm (10–25 employees) 0.083 
[0.276] 
0.000 1.000 
Medium Firm (26–100 employees) 0.146 
[0.353] 
0.000 1.000 
Big Firm (101–500 employees) 0.217 
[0.412] 
0.000 1.000 
Huge Firm (more than 500 employees) 0.515 
[0.500] 
0.000 1.000 
Partially Unionized Firm 0.318 
[0.466] 
0.000 1.000 
Fully Unionized Firm 0.009 
[0.094] 
0.000 1.000 
Industry Income (1000s of dollars) 22.749 
[5.754] 
7.400 40.321 
Notes: The sample consists of 1898 persons who purchased health insurance policies through their employer. 
Standard deviations are in brackets. 
Source: Authors’ calculations using data on employer and health plan characteristics from the 1987 National 
Medical Expenditure Survey (NMES) and data on specific vocational preparation (SVP) from the 1977 
Dictionary of Occupational Titles.  
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Table 5. Effect of Job Attachment on Lifetime Maximum Benefits 
 
 Single-Plan Firms Multiple-Plan Firms Difference-in-Differences 
 Industry SVP 
1980 
(1) 
Industry SVP 
1987 
(2) 
IV  
Model 
(3) 
Industry SVP 
1980 
(4) 
Industry SVP 
1987 
(5) 
IV  
Model 
 (6) 
Industry SVP 
1980 
(7) 
Industry SVP 
1987 
(8) 
Intercept 271,759 
(344,617) 
[0.431] 
351,763 
(252,301) 
[0.165] 
259,130 
(348,377) 
[0.458] 
984,337 
(264,119) 
[0.000] 
977,189 
(249,138) 
[0.000] 
937,326 
(287,967) 
[0.001] 
973,103 
(237,605) 
[0.000] 
1,079,422 
(254,537) 
[0.000] 
Industry SVP 121,758 
(75,521) 
[0.109] 
89,641 
(49,634) 
[0.072] 
112,413 
(80,794) 
[0.166] 
20,158 
(30,004) 
[0.503] 
32,920 
(30,800) 
[0.287] 
28,258 
(43,222) 
[0.514] 
-8706 
(39,225) 
[0.825] 
-38,199 
(45,883) 
[0.406] 
Single-Plan Firm --- --- --- --- --- --- -661,527 
(457,599) 
[0.150] 
-799,166 
(445,559) 
[0.074] 
Single-Plan Firm  
x Industry SVP 
--- --- --- --- --- --- 140,097 
(96,838) 
[0.150] 
162,230 
(91,017) 
[0.076] 
R-squared 0.030 0.033 0.032 0.042 0.038 0.039 0.028 0.028 
Number of 
Observations 
1208 1228 1208 797 810 797 2005 2038 
Partial F-statistic  
for instrument 
--- --- 328.55 --- --- 91.83 --- --- 
Notes: Dependent variable is the maximum lifetime dollar benefit each policyholder is entitled to receive. Standard errors are shown in parentheses; p-values are shown 
in brackets. Standard errors are adjusted for both heteroscedasticity and within-industry error correlation. The instrumental variable models use Industry SVP 1980 as 
an instrument for Industry SVP 1987. All regressions include controls for type of coverage (single, two-party, family, or other), self-insurance status of employer (fully 
self-insured, partially self-insured, or commercial insurance), type of insurance (HMO or indemnity), type of employer (for profit, nonprofit, government, or other), 
region (northeast, midwest, south, or west), urban location (SMSA or non-SMSA), firm size (indicator variables for: < 10 employees, 10-25 employees, 26-100 
employees, 101-500 employees, > 500 employees), employer unionization (fully unionized, partially unionized, or non-union), and industry income. Results for these 
variables are shown in Table 5A. 
Source: Authors’ calculations derived from Equation (6). 
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Table 5A. Effect of Covariates on Lifetime Maximum Benefits 
 
 Single-Plan Firms Multiple-Plan Firms Difference-in-Differences 
 Industry SVP 
1980 
(1) 
Industry SVP 
1987 
(2) 
IV  
Model 
(3) 
Industry SVP 
1980 
(4) 
Industry SVP 
1987 
(5) 
IV  
Model 
 (6) 
Industry SVP 
1980 
(7) 
Industry SVP 
1987 
(8) 
Two Party Policy -95,603 
(59,886) 
[0.112] 
-93,786 
(60,359) 
[0.122] 
-96,804 
(62,645) 
[0.124] 
215,331 
(167,047) 
[0.199] 
202,287 
(163,326) 
[0.217] 
212,053 
(165,770) 
[0.203] 
51,843 
(85,898) 
[0.547] 
47,591 
(84,562) 
[0.574] 
Family Policy -771 
(48,909) 
[0.987] 
-7556 
(47,285) 
[0.873] 
-7477 
(48,239) 
[0.877] 
22,669 
(40,880) 
[0.580] 
18,502 
(41,702) 
[0.658] 
18,855 
(42,335) 
[0.657] 
8855 
(32,746) 
[0.787] 
3669 
(31,963) 
[0.909] 
Other Policy -251,141 
(79,093) 
[0.002] 
-237,443 
(77,968) 
[0.003] 
-251,444 
(80,280) 
[0.002] 
-6536 
(75,773) 
[0.931] 
-17,273 
(77,771) 
[0.825] 
-14,193 
(78,592) 
[0.857] 
-120,850 
(64,011) 
[0.060] 
-119,520 
(62,946) 
[0.059] 
Self Insured 
Policy 
-114,374 
(83,086) 
[0.170] 
-120,228 
(84,003) 
[0.154] 
-115,880 
(83,143) 
[0.165] 
-24,637 
(56,311) 
[0.662] 
-29,787 
(54,220) 
[0.584] 
-32,916 
(55,231) 
[0.552] 
-79,881 
(53,154) 
[0.134] 
-82,209 
(52,460) 
[0.119] 
Partially Self 
Insured Policy 
-13,416 
(113,765) 
[0.906] 
-11,481 
(116,155) 
[0.921] 
-8678 
(113,416) 
[0.939] 
-64,259 
(71,282) 
[0.369] 
-62,913 
(71,105) 
[0.378] 
-61,839 
(70,821) 
[0.384] 
-59,455 
(64,927) 
[0.361] 
-55,308 
(63,234) 
[0.383] 
Policy is an HMO 121,479 
(100,136) 
[0.227] 
66,446 
(64,796) 
[0.306] 
76,099 
(84,495) 
[0.369] 
36,535 
(95,806) 
[0.703] 
49,617 
(94,937) 
[0.602] 
47,854 
(95,175) 
[0.616] 
62,376 
(68,183) 
[0.361] 
55,397 
(61,721) 
[0.370] 
Nonprofit 
Organization 
-115,960 
(77,553) 
[0.136] 
-89,338 
(59,854) 
[0.137] 
-104,023 
(74,990) 
[0.167] 
-107,117 
(87,185) 
[0.221] 
-99,771 
(82,948) 
[0.231] 
-100,641 
(82,559) 
[0.225] 
-102,896 
(60,033) 
[0.088] 
-85,698 
(51,351) 
[0.097] 
Government 
Organization 
-54,718 
(92,999) 
[0.557] 
-26,426 
(74,593) 
[0.724] 
-37,559 
(84,199) 
[0.656] 
-24,032 
(49,118) 
[0.625] 
-36,654 
(49,289) 
[0.458] 
-27,327 
(49,706) 
[0.583] 
-28,770 
(52,926) 
[0.587] 
-14,952 
(42,977) 
[0.728] 
Other 
Organization 
-137,214 
(106,560) 
[0.199] 
-118,664 
(102,341) 
[0.248] 
-121,927 
(104,321) 
[0.244] 
-59,977 
(70,416) 
[0.396] 
-58,147 
(69,497) 
[0.404] 
-67,791 
(74,604) 
[0.365] 
-95,391 
(64,730) 
[0.142] 
-67,322 
(58,724) 
[0.253] 
Midwest -15,227 
(154,583) 
[0.922] 
-22,338 
(159,690) 
[0.889] 
-25,161 
(158,480) 
[0.874] 
26,901 
(68,255) 
[0.694] 
14,505 
(71,443) 
[0.839] 
15,622 
(72,370) 
[0.829] 
5833 
(79,550) 
[0.942] 
-3923 
(82,263) 
[0.962] 
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Table 5A (cont.). Effect of Covariates on Lifetime Maximum Benefits 
 
 Single-Plan Firms Multiple-Plan Firms Difference-in-Differences 
 Industry SVP 
1980 
(1) 
Industry SVP 
1987 
(2) 
IV  
Model 
(3) 
Industry SVP 
1980 
(4) 
Industry SVP 
1987 
(5) 
IV  
Model 
 (6) 
Industry SVP 
1980 
(7) 
Industry SVP 
1987 
(8) 
South -125,489 
(180,121) 
[0.487] 
-120,177 
(177,802) 
[0.500] 
-121,775 
(177,963) 
[0.495] 
-27,700 
(72,724) 
[0.704] 
-38,203 
(74,324) 
[0.608] 
-36,266 
(76,463) 
[0.636] 
-76,564 
(92,932) 
[0.411] 
-81,231 
(92,114) 
[0.379] 
West -19,367 
(189,036) 
[0.919] 
-19,117 
(186,658) 
[0.919] 
-25,083 
(189,933) 
[0.895] 
44,503 
(86,654) 
[0.608] 
38,759 
(87,217) 
[0.657] 
45,349 
(88,083) 
[0.607] 
20,711 
(98,030) 
[0.833] 
19,099 
(95,603) 
[0.842] 
Urban Location 9818 
(42,006) 
[0.815] 
7593 
(41,866) 
[0.856] 
3561 
(41,845) 
[0.932] 
81,953 
(71,495) 
[0.254] 
82,056 
(67,798) 
[0.228] 
84,384 
(69,613) 
[0.227] 
30,054 
(36,762) 
[0.415] 
28,755 
(35,750) 
[0.422] 
Small Firm (10 – 
25 employees) 
214,424 
(96,991) 
[0.028] 
179,837 
(94,426) 
[0.058] 
201,084 
(94,918) 
[0.035] 
108,374 
(177,254) 
[0.542] 
-18,174 
(175,745) 
[0.918] 
36,112 
(191,172) 
[0.850] 
206,041 
(85,984) 
[0.017] 
170,274 
(84,580) 
[0.045] 
Medium Firm (26 
– 100 employees) 
109,958 
(73,411) 
[0.136] 
80,167 
(69,239) 
[0.248] 
100,624 
(71,813) 
[0.163] 
137,018 
(161,265) 
[0.397] 
22,676 
(155,993) 
[0.885] 
74,873 
(175,399) 
[0.670] 
115,999 
(61,342) 
[0.060] 
88,031 
(58,621) 
[0.135] 
Big Firm (101 – 
500 employees) 
85,308 
(91,102) 
[0.350] 
46,335 
(78,427) 
[0.555] 
66,378 
(84,026) 
[0.431] 
159,988 
(155,403) 
[0.305] 
49,633 
(149,432) 
[0.740] 
98,689 
(169,543) 
[0.561] 
105,383 
(75,422) 
[0.164] 
70,611 
(66,662) 
[0.291] 
Huge Firm (more 
than 500 
employees) 
163,291 
(190,474) 
[0.392] 
131,716 
(179,827) 
[0.465] 
156,051 
(187,243) 
[0.406] 
62,276 
(158,957) 
[0.696] 
-43,831 
(151,805) 
[0.773] 
6648 
(172,151) 
[0.969] 
108,266 
(126,604) 
[0.393] 
81,487 
(119,629) 
[0.497] 
Partially 
Unionized Firm 
-208,766 
(95,116) 
[0.029] 
-205,014 
(92,250) 
[0.027] 
-205,731 
(92,360) 
[0.027] 
-80,262 
(58,397) 
[0.171] 
-107,086 
(49,971) 
[0.034] 
-109,616 
(52,051) 
[0.037] 
-154,479 
(48,573) 
[0.002] 
-167,302 
(47,880) 
[0.001] 
Fully Unionized 
Firm 
-406,258 
(185,237) 
[0.029] 
-472,593 
(178,523) 
[0.009] 
-425,072 
(195,477) 
[0.031] 
-9695 
(126,529) 
[0.939] 
-53,374 
(113,914) 
[0.640] 
-55,538 
(115,778) 
[0.632] 
-223,658 
(113,656) 
[0.050] 
-279,984 
(119,449) 
[0.020] 
Industry Income 
(1000s of dollars) 
5808 
(7838) 
[0.460] 
7751 
(6369) 
[0.225] 
6062 
(5617) 
[0.282] 
-30,402 
(13,718) 
[0.028] 
-13,450 
(6884) 
[0.053] 
-13,080 
(7243) 
[0.073] 
-7864 
(6753) 
[0.246] 
-323 
(4146) 
[0.938] 
Notes: Dependent variable is the maximum lifetime dollar benefit each policyholder is entitled to receive. Standard errors are shown in parentheses; p-values are shown 
in brackets. Standard errors are adjusted for both heteroscedasticity and within-industry error correlation. 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
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Table 6. Effect of Job Attachment on Annual Stop-Losses 
 
 Single-Plan Firms Multiple-Plan Firms Difference-in-Differences 
 Industry SVP 
1980 
(1) 
Industry SVP 
1987 
(2) 
IV  
Model 
(3) 
Industry SVP 
1980 
(4) 
Industry SVP 
1987 
(5) 
IV  
Model 
 (6) 
Industry SVP 
1980 
(7) 
Industry SVP 
1987 
(8) 
Intercept 1453.70 
(725.28) 
[0.046] 
758.36 
(678.55) 
[0.265] 
1874.17 
(838.62) 
[0.027] 
726.10 
(1142.68) 
[0.526] 
-96.24 
(952.63) 
[0.920] 
644.93 
(1313.21) 
[0.624] 
166.81 
(807.42) 
[0.837] 
-434.25 
(695.71) 
[0.533] 
Industry SVP -327.22 
(167.17) 
[0.052] 
-209.71 
(165.72) 
[0.207] 
-547.32 
(258.00) 
[0.035] 
93.13 
(165.01) 
[0.573] 
319.81 
(145.33) 
[0.029] 
169.45 
(295.43) 
[0.567] 
11.79 
(153.32) 
[0.939] 
138.55 
(145.99) 
[0.344] 
Single-Plan Firm --- --- --- --- --- --- 1462.57 
(959.60) 
[0.129] 
1445.52 
(860.79) 
[0.095] 
Single-Plan Firm  
x Industry SVP 
--- --- --- --- --- --- -288.23 
(173.73) 
[0.099] 
-270.39 
(157.35) 
[0.087] 
R-squared 0.180 0.176 0.174 0.215 0.217 0.217 0.178 0.176 
Number of 
Observations 
1116 1134 1116 750 764 750 1866 1898 
Partial F-statistic  
for instrument 
--- --- 346.61 --- --- 116.36 --- --- 
Notes: Dependent variable is the policyholder’s annual stop-loss, defined as the expenditure threshold above which the policyholder is no longer required to make co-
payments. Standard errors are shown in parentheses; p-values are shown in brackets. Standard errors are adjusted for both heteroscedasticity and within-industry error 
correlation. The instrumental variable models use Industry SVP 1980 as an instrument for Industry SVP 1987. All regressions include controls for type of coverage 
(single, two-party, family, or other), self-insurance status of employer (fully self-insured, partially self-insured, or commercial insurance), type of insurance (HMO or 
indemnity), type of employer (for profit, nonprofit, government, or other), region (northeast, midwest, south, or west), urban location (SMSA or non-SMSA), firm size 
(indicator variables for: < 10 employees, 10-25 employees, 26-100 employees, 101-500 employees, > 500 employees), employer unionization (fully unionized, partially 
unionized, or non-union), and industry income. The nature of the stop-loss provisions necessitated the inclusion of two additional controls: an indicator for whether the 
stop-loss applies to covered or out-of-pocket expenses and an indicator for whether the annual deductible is counted toward the stop-loss. Results for these variables are 
shown in Table 6A. 
Source: Authors’ calculations derived from Equations (6) and (7). 
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Table 6A. Effect of Covariates on Annual Stop-Losses 
 
 Single-Plan Firms Multiple-Plan Firms Difference-in-Differences 
 Industry SVP 
1980 
(1) 
Industry SVP 
1987 
(2) 
IV  
Model 
(3) 
Industry SVP 
1980 
(4) 
Industry SVP 
1987 
(5) 
IV  
Model 
 (6) 
Industry SVP 
1980 
(7) 
Industry SVP 
1987 
(8) 
Stop-Loss Based 
on Covered 
Expenses 
2515.67 
(220.43) 
[0.000] 
2504.52 
(210.68) 
[0.000] 
2515.41 
(216.44) 
[0.000] 
2104.89 
(216.72) 
[0.000] 
2082.72 
(215.91) 
[0.000] 
2098.49 
(222.11) 
[0.000] 
2368.33 
(156.89) 
[0.000] 
2350.66 
(153.37) 
[0.000] 
Stop-Loss 
Includes 
Deductible 
-34.90 
(231.62) 
[0.880] 
-56.98 
(232.18) 
[0.806] 
-46.37 
(235.46) 
[0.844] 
-196.57 
(181.03) 
[0.279] 
-211.29 
(177.16) 
[0.235] 
-200.21 
(180.99) 
[0.270] 
-87.67 
(177.28) 
[0.621] 
-109.71 
(175.66) 
[0.533] 
Two Party Policy 253.64 
(386.24) 
[0.512] 
155.57 
(392.85) 
[0.693] 
197.11 
(390.40) 
[0.614] 
-507.78 
(260.81) 
[0.053] 
-495.75 
(254.39) 
[0.053] 
-513.32 
(260.03) 
[0.050] 
-151.55 
(235.46) 
[0.521] 
-177.87 
(234.75) 
[0.450] 
Family Policy 228.52 
(207.36) 
[0.272] 
194.36 
(200.78) 
[0.334] 
205.38 
(204.28) 
[0.316] 
-161.92 
(188.62) 
[0.392] 
-144.50 
(184.30) 
[0.434] 
-153.22 
(190.04) 
[0.421] 
69.81 
(149.03) 
[0.640] 
58.82 
(143.10) 
[0.681] 
Other Policy 628.97 
(809.08) 
[0.438] 
379.55 
(805.02) 
[0.638] 
562.60 
(821.11) 
[0.494] 
-578.03 
(412.74) 
[0.164] 
-538.64 
(398.57) 
[0.179] 
-560.72 
(400.82) 
[0.164] 
261.83 
(549.77) 
[0.634] 
139.30 
(546.39) 
[0.799] 
Self Insured 
Policy 
-380.16 
(301.23) 
[0.208] 
-384.30 
(303.10) 
[0.206] 
-394.10 
(305.63) 
[0.199] 
230.38 
(205.23) 
[0.264] 
227.70 
(201.15) 
[0.260] 
245.10 
(206.85) 
[0.238] 
-101.77 
(202.39) 
[0.616] 
-104.90 
(198.85) 
[0.598] 
Partially Self 
Insured Policy 
169.10 
(1021.29) 
[0.869] 
153.94 
(1030.21) 
[0.881] 
93.62 
(1047.14) 
[0.929] 
65.75 
(312.93) 
[0.834] 
70.04 
(309.59) 
[0.821] 
69.11 
(311.72) 
[0.825] 
170.97 
(409.05) 
[0.676] 
166.87 
(408.21) 
[0.683] 
Policy is an HMO 742.17 
(719.99) 
[0.304] 
921.18 
(752.46) 
[0.222] 
929.44 
(899.29) 
[0.303] 
1800.59 
(569.48) 
[0.002] 
1770.59 
(575.31) 
[0.002] 
1769.95 
(576.09) 
[0.003] 
1560.40 
(485.88) 
[0.002] 
1582.84 
(488.22) 
[0.001] 
Nonprofit 
Organization 
3.56 
(252.65) 
[0.989] 
-75.43 
(266.77) 
[0.778] 
165.49 
(288.06) 
[0.566] 
-50.20 
(304.86) 
[0.869] 
-168.03 
(268.99) 
[0.533] 
-98.58 
(314.63) 
[0.754] 
-15.67 
(162.30) 
[0.923] 
-99.91 
(158.60) 
[0.529] 
Government 
Organization 
402.21 
(295.37) 
[0.175] 
343.14 
(284.10) 
[0.229] 
472.51 
(314.22) 
[0.134] 
-162.23 
(220.73) 
[0.464] 
-281.61 
(191.26) 
[0.143] 
-192.43 
(255.85) 
[0.453] 
103.39 
(187.46) 
[0.582] 
39.00 
(176.05) 
[0.825] 
Other 
Organization 
-363.03 
(321.71) 
[0.261] 
-464.16 
(324.27) 
[0.154] 
-449.30 
(302.42) 
[0.139] 
-413.36 
(352.21) 
[0.242] 
-410.83 
(342.54) 
[0.232] 
-427.98 
(385.89) 
[0.269] 
-346.99 
(248.79) 
[0.165] 
-368.99 
(253.75) 
[0.147] 
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Table 6A (cont.). Effect of Covariates on Annual Stop-Losses 
 
 Single-Plan Firms Multiple-Plan Firms Difference-in-Differences 
 Industry SVP 
1980 
(1) 
Industry SVP 
1987 
(2) 
IV  
Model 
(3) 
Industry SVP 
1980 
(4) 
Industry SVP 
1987 
(5) 
IV  
Model 
 (6) 
Industry SVP 
1980 
(7) 
Industry SVP 
1987 
(8) 
Midwest 181.14 
(175.17) 
[0.302] 
187.62 
(176.42) 
[0.289] 
184.06 
(179.63) 
[0.307] 
183.12 
(215.04) 
[0.396] 
161.21 
(215.80) 
[0.456] 
177.41 
(218.15) 
[0.417] 
116.37 
(157.19) 
[0.460] 
120.54 
(153.34) 
[0.433] 
South  494.93 
(193.62) 
[0.011] 
478.50 
(197.08) 
[0.016] 
496.46 
(198.08) 
[0.013] 
98.83 
(253.17) 
[0.697] 
139.66 
(236.08) 
[0.555] 
107.53 
(250.48) 
[0.668] 
311.34 
(173.61) 
[0.074] 
322.08 
(165.96) 
[0.054] 
West 1253.12 
(517.29) 
[0.016] 
1161.89 
(511.14) 
[0.024] 
1242.45 
(514.84) 
[0.017] 
246.32 
(287.63) 
[0.393] 
220.63 
(283.17) 
[0.437] 
244.57 
(288.25) 
[0.398] 
711.17 
(327.68) 
[0.020] 
719.40 
(323.20) 
[0.027] 
Urban Location 176.53 
(247.29) 
[0.476] 
141.55 
(236.50) 
[0.550] 
193.98 
(245.84) 
[0.431] 
-205.41 
(236.13) 
[0.386] 
-214.22 
(250.23) 
[0.393] 
-208.37 
(236.51) 
[0.380] 
23.06 
(175.73) 
[0.896] 
-9.51 
(172.83) 
[0.956] 
Small Firm (10 – 
25 employees) 
289.12 
(306.00) 
[0.346] 
353.48 
(294.92) 
[0.232] 
318.71 
(305.90) 
[0.299] 
196.69 
(811.24) 
[0.809] 
350.78 
(783.47) 
[0.655] 
173.58 
(832.90) 
[0.835] 
289.40 
(286.79) 
[0.314] 
351.18 
(276.14) 
[0.205] 
Medium Firm (26 
– 100 employees) 
200.03 
(216.25) 
[0.356] 
293.37 
(223.64) 
[0.191] 
201.68 
(220.12) 
[0.361] 
-95.61 
(746.41) 
[0.898] 
98.48 
(680.90) 
[0.885] 
-111.88 
(732.92) 
[0.879] 
183.05 
(210.77) 
[0.386] 
278.39 
(213.26) 
[0.193] 
Big Firm (101 – 
500 employees) 
307.18 
(244.99) 
[0.211] 
433.19 
(260.42) 
[0.098] 
308.31 
(257.40) 
[0.233] 
-267.57 
(698.31) 
[0.702] 
-49.97 
(679.83) 
[0.942] 
-268.29 
(717.08) 
[0.709] 
187.86 
(229.11) 
[0.413] 
314.79 
(238.38) 
[0.188] 
Huge Firm (more 
than 500 
employees) 
936.24 
(396.96) 
[0.019] 
1046.69 
(418.58) 
[0.013] 
933.41 
(404.80) 
[0.022] 
97.70 
(660.24) 
[0.883] 
293.44 
(635.86) 
[0.645] 
83.25 
(675.24) 
[0.902] 
685.91 
(274.59) 
[0.013] 
781.82 
(286.25) 
[0.007] 
Partially 
Unionized Firm 
-294.61 
(304.49) 
[0.335] 
-247.14 
(284.14) 
[0.386] 
-298.29 
(283.89) 
[0.295] 
-24.68 
(239.75) 
[0.918] 
63.16 
(231.32) 
[0.785] 
23.79 
(263.54) 
[0.928] 
-155.83 
(188.86) 
[0.410] 
-96.13 
(180.47) 
[0.595] 
Fully Unionized 
Firm 
-508.25 
(580.39) 
[0.382] 
-530.88 
(555.89) 
[0.341] 
-614.06 
(575.79) 
[0.288] 
-545.67 
(396.46) 
[0.171] 
-474.82 
(385.46) 
[0.220] 
-499.12 
(392.54) 
[0.206] 
-493.14 
(307.92) 
[0.111] 
-451.26 
(294.36) 
[0.127] 
Industry Income 
(1000s of dollars) 
19.48 
(56.54) 
[0.731] 
15.97 
(22.29) 
[0.475] 
44.42 
(30.47) 
[0.147] 
27.80 
(39.33) 
[0.481] 
-10.92 
(19.74) 
[0.581] 
0.19 
(28.44) 
[0.995] 
24.83 
(36.01) 
[0.491] 
7.38 
(15.06) 
[0.625] 
Notes: Dependent variable is the policyholder’s annual stop-loss, defined as the expenditure threshold above which the policyholder is no longer required to make 
co-payments. Standard errors are shown in parentheses; p-values are shown in brackets. Standard errors are adjusted for both heteroscedasticity and within-industry 
error correlation. 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
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Figure 2. Spot Market and Full Commitment Contracts 
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Figure 3. Single-Contract Benefit Packages 
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